《善恶的彼岸》开篇：英文原著带中文翻译

1. The Will to Truth, which is to tempt us to many a hazardous enterprise, the famous Truthfulness of which all philosophers have hitherto spoken with respect, what questions has this Will to Truth not laid before us! What strange, perplexing, questionable questions! It is already a long story; yet it seems as if it were hardly commenced. Is it any wonder if we at last grow distrustful, lose patience, and turn impatiently away? That this Sphinx teaches us at last to ask questions ourselves? WHO is it really that puts questions to us here? WHAT really is this "Will to Truth" in us? In fact we made a long halt at the question as to the origin of this Will—until at last we came to an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question. We inquired about the VALUE of this Will. Granted that we want the truth: WHY NOT RATHER untruth? And uncertainty? Even ignorance? The problem of the value of truth presented itself before us—or was it we who presented ourselves before the problem? Which of us is the Oedipus here? Which the Sphinx? It would seem to be a rendezvous of questions and notes of interrogation. And could it be believed that it at last seems to us as if the problem had never been propounded before, as if we were the first to discern it, get a sight of it, and RISK RAISING it? For there is risk in raising it, perhaps there is no greater risk.

求真理的意志，这意志诱我们冒许多险，那著名的、至今一切哲学家谈起都肃然起敬的真诚，它何曾不向我们提出种种问题！何等奇特、令人困惑、可疑的问题！这故事说来已长，却仿佛刚刚开始。我们终于对它起疑、失去耐心、不耐烦地掉头而去，这有什么奇怪？这斯芬克斯终于教我们自己发问，这有什么奇怪？在这里向我们发问的究竟是谁？我们心中的这个「求真理的意志」究竟是什么？事实上，我们曾长久停在这个意志的起源问题上，直到最后在一个更根本的问题面前完全停住。我们追问这个意志的价值。假定我们要真理：为什么不要非真理？不要不确定？甚至不要无知？真理的价值问题出现在我们面前，或者说，是我们自己出现在这个问题面前？这里谁是俄狄浦斯？谁是斯芬克斯？看来这是问题与问号的相会。难道能相信，我们最后竟觉得这问题从未被提出过，仿佛我们是头一批看出它、瞥见它并敢于提出它的人？因为提出它是有风险的，也许没有比这更大的风险了。

2. "HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, an origin of THEIR own—in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory, in the concealed God, in the 'Thing-in-itself—THERE must be their source, and nowhere else!"—This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this "belief" of theirs, they exert themselves for their "knowledge," for something that is in the end solemnly christened "the Truth." The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESES OF VALUES. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, "DE OMNIBUS DUBITANDUM." For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below—"frog perspectives," as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretence, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that WHAT constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things—perhaps even in being essentially identical with them. Perhaps! But who wishes to concern himself with such dangerous "Perhapses"! For that investigation one must await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent—philosophers of the dangerous "Perhaps" in every sense of the term. And to speak in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers beginning to appear.

「某物怎能从其反面产生？例如真理从错误产生？或者求真理的意志从求欺骗的意志产生？或者无私的行为从自私产生？或者智者那纯净如阳光的洞见从贪欲产生？这样的产生是不可能的；谁梦想这种事，谁就是傻瓜，不，比傻瓜更糟；最高价值之物必定有另一种起源，一种它们自己的起源，它们不可能出自这个转瞬即逝、诱人、虚幻、渺小的世界，不可能出自这种迷妄与贪欲的纷乱。它们毋宁说出自存在的怀抱，出自不变者，出自隐蔽的神，出自「自在之物」，它们的起源必定在那里，而不在别处！」这种推论方式暴露出一切时代的形而上学家都可据以辨认的典型偏见，这种评价方式藏在他们的全部逻辑程序背后；通过他们的这种「信仰」，他们为自己的「知识」卖力，为某种最终被郑重命名为「真理」的东西卖力。形而上学家的基本信仰是：对价值对立的信仰。他们中最谨慎的人也不曾想到在这门槛上怀疑，然而怀疑在这里恰恰最为必要；尽管他们曾立下庄严誓言：「一切皆可怀疑。」因为首先可以怀疑：对立究竟是否存在；其次可以怀疑：那些流行的评价和价值对立，即形而上学家盖上印章的东西，也许不过是肤浅的估计，不过是暂时的视角，而且很可能是从某个角落、也许是从下面看去的，「青蛙的视角」，借用画家中间流行的一个说法。尽管真、肯定、无私自有其价值，但也许可以给假象、求欺骗的意志、自私和贪欲，为一般生命指定一种更高、更根本的价值。甚至也许那些善良而受尊敬之物的价值，恰恰在于它们与这些恶的、表面上对立之物暗中相关、纠缠、编织在一起，也许甚至本质上与它们同一。也许吧！可是谁愿意去理会这些危险的「也许」！为了这种研究，人们必须等待一种新哲学家的出现，他们会有别的趣味和倾向，与迄今流行的相反，是危险「也许」的哲学家，在这个词的一切意义上。说正经的，我看见这样的新哲学家已开始出现。